



SAME DAY INJURY: AMAZON FAILS TO DELIVER SAFE JOBS



**STRATEGIC
ORGANIZING
CENTER**

SAME DAY INJURY: AMAZON FAILS TO DELIVER SAFE JOBS

ABOUT THE STRATEGIC ORGANIZING CENTER

The Strategic Organizing Center (SOC) is a democratic coalition of three labor unions: Service Employees International Union (SEIU), Communications Workers of America (CWA) and United Farmworkers of America (UFW). Together, SOC affiliated unions represent 2.3 million workers. The SOC is a labor union innovation center dedicated to improving the lives of working people, partnering with its affiliates to develop effective strategies to support workers organizing for better lives for themselves and their families. We stand against structural racism and fight not only for jobs, but good jobs: safe, equitable workplaces where all employees are respected, paid living wages and have real power at work.

Learn more at: thesoc.org

Cover art:
Tabitha Arnold, "Time Off Task," 2022.
www.tabithaarnold.com



**STRATEGIC
ORGANIZING
CENTER**

INTRODUCTION

In 2021, Amazon responded to years of intense scrutiny of its high rates of worker injuries by announcing a series of ambitious safety initiatives. Founder and then-CEO Jeff Bezos proclaimed in his annual letter to shareholders that the company would seek to become “Earth’s Safest Place to Work,” and the company announced its goal of reducing its recordable incident rate by 50 percent by 2025.¹ Yet three years after its bold statements about safety, Amazon has not made meaningful progress on its goals and is not realistically on track to cut its injury rates by 50 percent—or to become a safer employer than its peers. Amazon has the resources and sophistication to dramatically improve its safety performance. The fact that it has failed to do so suggests that management has chosen to focus on other priorities, such as increasing production speed and cutting costs, rather than addressing the pain and suffering that Amazon’s ongoing injury crisis places on injured workers, their families and communities.

The Strategic Organizing Center (SOC) analyzed Amazon’s own injury data that it submitted to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and found that Amazon’s overall injury rate in 2023 was 6.5 injuries per 100 workers. In 2020, the last full year of injury data before Amazon announced its goal of reducing its injury rate by 50 percent, Amazon’s overall injury rate was 6.6 per 100 workers.² In the three years since Mr. Bezos announced the goal of becoming “Earth’s Safest Place to Work,” Amazon has succeeded in reducing its overall injury rate by less than two percent. Amazon is nowhere close to meeting its target of cutting its total injury rate in half by 2025.

Due to the company’s scale, Amazon’s failure to improve its injury rates has enormous consequences. Over the last three years, the company has reported over 106,000 serious injuries resulting in workers taking more than 6.1 million days away from their primary job assignment to recover from their injuries.³ In 2023, Amazon reported a serious injury once every 14.5 minutes, on average.⁴ Each of these injuries represents significant pain and suffering for an Amazon worker, as well as the very real possibility of life-long pain and physical limitations. As alarming as these figures are, they may represent only a partial accounting of the true crisis, as these numbers do not include instances where injured workers may have been improperly sent back to work by Amazon’s internal Amcare clinics without recording their injury. A recent OSHA investigation in Missouri found that many injured workers visited Amcare clinics 20 or more times without being referred to outside medical care.⁵ Amazon’s warehouse operations continue to be dramatically more dangerous for workers than the rest of the industry. In 2023, the serious injury rate at Amazon warehouses was 6.1 per 100 workers—more than double the rate at non-Amazon warehouses (3.0 per 100).⁶ While Amazon employed 35 percent of all U.S. warehouse workers in 2023, the company was responsible for more than half (53 percent) of all serious injuries in the industry.

Using the company’s new 2023 case-level injury data collected by OSHA and released for the first time in 2024, SOC analyzed the timing of Amazon’s reported injuries in 2023 and found that injury levels spiked by as much as 59 percent around the company’s peak oper-

ational periods including Prime Days and the holiday shopping season kickoff in November.⁷ This new analysis found that during the weeks of Prime Day and Cyber Monday, Amazon's drive to super-charge production speed resulted in more than one thousand serious injuries per week across all Amazon facilities and accounted for nearly two-thirds of all serious injuries in the warehouse industry during those weeks.⁸

SOC's analysis of Amazon and non-Amazon warehouse injury data found that Amazon is an outlier in the warehouse industry, with more than eight in 10 of its seriously injured workers returning to work immediately at alternate "light duty" assignments rather than recovering at home, as compared to less than half of seriously injured workers at non-Amazon warehouses.⁹ SOC's analysis of Amazon's case-level injury data also found that seriously injured Amazon warehouse workers needed more time to recover, spending an average of 50 percent longer away from their regular jobs at alternate "light duty" assignments than non-Amazon workers.

In Mr. Bezos' last letter to shareholders as CEO in 2021, he said of the company's new focus on safety that "we have never failed when we set our minds to something, and we're not going to fail

at this either," while emphasizing his intention as incoming Executive Chair to take a personal role in improving safety at Amazon.¹⁰ In Amazon CEO Andy Jassy's first letter to shareholders in 2022, he said he would not be satisfied without "transformational results" on safety.¹¹ Just two years later, in the context of the company's failure to substantially improve its safety performance, Jassy did not use the word "injury" even once in his letter to shareholders and did not discuss any of the company's efforts to become "Earth's Safest Place to Work." Instead, Mr. Jassy reinforced the company's obsession with speed, boasting that in 2023 Amazon "delivered at the fastest speeds ever to Prime members" and highlighted the company's ongoing efforts to cut costs in its fulfillment operations and to use these savings to "invest in speed."¹² It is hard to imagine a set of priorities less protective of workers' safety than cutting costs while pushing for ever-faster production speeds. In spite of Mr. Bezos' proclamation that Amazon would not fail at dramatically improving its performance, all signs show that the company is in fact failing at keeping workers safe on the job, while its leadership doubles down on speed as its top priority.




OVERVIEW OF AMAZON'S INJURY DATA

SOC's analysis is based on data that Amazon and other employers provided to OSHA annually from 2017 to 2023. All employers are legally required to submit annual injury and illness reports to OSHA for any warehouse, delivery, grocery or wholesale trade facility with 20 or more employees. Amazon reported injury and illness information for 1,073 warehouse, logistics and delivery facilities in 2023.¹³ Those reports covered an average annual workforce of 742,654 in 2023.¹⁴

These reports show that each year, tens of thousands of Amazon workers are injured on the

job. In 2023, there were 38,348 total recordable injuries—defined as those requiring medical treatment beyond first aid or requiring time off a worker's regular job—at Amazon facilities.¹⁵ The vast majority of these were serious: 36,170, or 94 percent, of the injuries, were categorized as either light duty or lost time injuries—that is, injuries where workers were hurt so badly that they were either unable to perform their regular job functions (light duty) or forced to miss work entirely (lost time). The methodology used to analyze the data and the number of cases and injuries by type are presented in Appendices A and B, respectively.



As shown in Figure 1, Amazon has not made meaningful progress on its total rate of injuries or serious injuries over the seven-year period for which we have data, 2017-2023. Both Amazon's 2023 total injury rate (6.5 injuries per 100 full-time equivalent workers (FTEs)) and its rate of serious injuries—those requiring light duty or lost time (6.1/100)—are nearly identical to the rates it reported for 2020 (6.6/100 and 5.9/100, respectively).

The inadequacy of Amazon's safety efforts is illustrated by the dramatic improvements to injury rates that the company experienced during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, when its overall injury rate decreased by nearly 27 percent in one year. In March 2020, Amazon temporarily eased its work speed pressures but largely reinstated these by October 2020.¹⁶ Not surprisingly, injury rates increased in 2021 alongside the return of Amazon's immense production pressures on workers. This episode indicates that Amazon has the capacity to dramatically improve injury rates by reducing production pressures, and its subsequent failure to sustain these improvements should raise questions about whether the company is placing other corporate priorities ahead of worker safety. While Amazon has reported marginal year-over-year improvements in injury rates since its major injury spike in 2021, management has refused to systematically reduce production pressure as it did in 2020, and thus has failed to deliver anything close to the 50 percent decrease in recordable injuries by 2025 that it said was the measure of success.

LIGHT DUTY INJURIES:

Injuries that require workers to be placed on light or restricted duty relative to their normal job responsibilities.

LOST TIME INJURIES:

Injuries that require workers to miss work entirely.


SERIOUS INJURIES:

Light duty and lost time injuries combined.

AMAZON'S WAREHOUSE INJURY RATE IS STILL FAR HIGHER THAN INDUSTRY

SOC also analyzed injury rates at the subset of 419 facilities categorized by Amazon under the “General Warehouse and Storage” industry in its reports to OSHA for 2023 and compared the company’s performance with all non-Amazon warehouse facilities reported to OSHA in the same year.¹⁷ SOC’s analysis found that Amazon’s injury rate at its warehouses remains 75 percent higher than the rate at non-Amazon

warehouses in 2023, and its rate of serious injuries is even worse—more than *twice as high* as the rate for non-Amazon warehouses.






AMAZON INJURIES SPIKED DURING PRIME DAYS AND HOLIDAY SHOPPING

Amazon's peak sales periods around Prime Day and the year-end holiday shopping season are hugely important for the company. July 11, the first Prime Day of 2023, was the single largest sales day in Amazon's history.¹⁸ For years, workers have spoken out about the mandatory overtime and intense production pressure that the company institutes during peak periods in order to satisfy huge order volumes at top speed.¹⁹

SOC's analysis of Amazon's case-level injury reports for 2023 found that injury cases surged dramatically during the company's peak periods.²⁰ Throughout 2023, Amazon recorded an

average total of 691 serious injuries per week in all its facilities.²¹ SOC's analysis found three very stark spikes in the injury level that occurred during and immediately after Amazon's major sales events, which include Prime Day (July 11-12), Prime Big Deal Days event (October 10-11), and the extended holiday season starting in November, peaking the week of Cyber Monday (November 27).²²

FIGURE 3: SERIOUS INJURIES AT AMAZON FACILITIES PER WEEK, 2023




As shown in Figure 3, Amazon reported its single highest weekly serious injury total, 1,066 cases, during the week of July 9, which included the company’s signature Prime Day sales event on July 11-12. This represented a 48 percent increase from the 721 serious injuries recorded the previous week. Injury levels remained elevated for the rest of July, only normalizing to the company’s baseline level by the week of July 30. During the week that Amazon held its Prime Big Deals Days on October 11-12, workers experienced a 37 percent surge over the previous week’s injury total (898 during the week of October 8 as compared to 655 in the week of October 1). Following the early October spike, the holiday season saw a steady increase start-

ing the week of October 29, until it reached a peak of 1,015 serious injuries during the week of November 26—a staggering 59 percent increase from the beginning of the holiday shopping period. The weekly number of injuries remained substantially above the company’s annual average until mid-December.²³

Looking specifically at the facilities Amazon categorizes in the warehousing industry, SOC’s analysis found similar injury spikes to those that were present in all Amazon facilities, as well as clear, year-round differences between Amazon and its peers in the industry. Although Amazon employed just over a third (35%) of the workforce in the warehousing

FIGURE 4: SERIOUS INJURIES AT AMAZON AND NON-AMAZON WAREHOUSES PER WEEK, 2023



ing industry in 2023, it accounted for a majority (53%) of the serious injuries reported in the industry.²⁴ This pattern is clearly illustrated in Figure 4, showing that Amazon reported higher numbers of serious injuries than non-Amazon warehouses in every single week of 2023. Amazon’s warehouses reported significant spikes in serious injury levels around the same three peaks: July Prime Days, October Prime Days and Cyber Monday. Injury levels at non-Amazon warehouses do not include such spikes shown in Amazon’s data, peaking at just 21 percent above the annual average, compared to the 48 percent spike at Amazon facilities around Prime Days. During the weeks of Prime Day and Cyber Monday, Amazon’s drive to super-charge production speed meant that the company

accounted for nearly two-thirds of all serious injuries reported in the warehouse industry during those weeks.

Amazon has known about the dramatic increases in injury levels during peak periods for many years and has failed to take meaningful steps to make its workplaces safe for workers during peak. Previous reporting by *Reveal* included internal Amazon injury data from 2016 through 2019 that clearly showed serious injuries peaking during July Prime Day and the week of Cyber Monday (Amazon did not hold a Prime Day event in October until 2020, and the earlier data shows no injury peak in October).²⁵ *Reveal*’s reporting also included internal Amazon documents that showed management was well aware

of the “high-risk situation” posed by mandatory overtime during peak periods, and in fact chose to pause or de-emphasize safety initiatives during peak periods.²⁶ In October 2023, Amazon put out a press release boasting about the 25 million items that U.S. Prime members had ordered with same-day or next-day delivery and the products that were delivered to one customer within 54 minutes.²⁷

What the company failed to mention was the nearly 900 serious injuries that workers suffered that week—a massive 37 percent surge from the previous week’s already-high level of injuries (655)—and a clear signal that the company prioritizes production speed over the safety of warehouse workers, the human beings who make its business run.²⁸


SERIOUS INJURIES, LIGHT DUTY: AMAZON’S EFFORTS TO REDUCE COSTS BY KEEPING INJURED WORKERS ON THE JOB

When workers are injured so seriously that they are unable to perform their regular jobs, employers like Amazon have two options: they can support a worker to take time off of work entirely to recover (“lost time”) or they can assign the injured worker to a less physically demanding job, also known as “light-duty”—often in response to a medical “restriction.” Amazon has a program called “return to work” which pushes injured workers to keep working in special light duty jobs while they are recovering from injuries too severe for them to work their normal positions.²⁹ This policy appears designed to reduce the number of lost time cases and save the company money on workers’ compensation premiums.³⁰ This program also may contribute to pressuring injured workers to return to work before they are ready. In a survey of Amazon workers by SOC in 2021, 37 percent of workers surveyed who had been injured reported that management pressured them to

return to work before they felt ready to do so.³¹ The push for light duty assignments also allows Amazon to reduce the number of injuries that it must report in the most severe injury category, involving lost time, which it has proudly cited as evidence of safety improvements.³²

Amazon’s push to shift seriously injured workers from lost time to light duty has been hugely effective in reducing the number of cases counted as the most serious category of injury. As shown in Figure 5, in 2018, the first year of the “Return to Work” program, only two in ten (20%) serious injury cases resulted in light duty, compared to more than eight in ten (83%) in 2023. In contrast, the share of light-duty cases at non-Amazon facilities actually decreased over the same period, decreasing from about 55 percent of all serious injury cases in 2017 to 47 percent in 2023.³³

FIGURE 5: SHARE OF SERIOUS INJURIES CLASSIFIED AS LIGHT-DUTY AT AMAZON AND NON-AMAZON WAREHOUSES, 2017 TO 2023



**Note: This graph includes 419 Amazon facilities reported under NAICS 493110-General Warehousing and Storage in 2023. Of these, Amazon previously classified 13 facilities under a different industry code.*

Injured Amazon workers who receive light duty assignments also spend much longer away from their regular jobs than their counterparts in the warehouse industry, suggesting that their injuries are more severe. In 2023, the average Amazon worker with a serious injury categorized as “light duty” spent 56 days away from their regular job, over 50 percent longer than the average for light duty cases at non-Amazon warehouses (37 days).³⁴ Amazon also uses light duty assignments for extremely long periods of time—9 percent of seriously injured workers at Amazon spent at least six months (180 days) on light duty, more than twice as often as workers at non-Amazon warehouses (4%).

SOC’s analysis of Amazon’s individual injury case data also shines new light on the compa-


ny’s treatment of workers with the most serious injuries, those which require days away from work, or “lost time.” Non-Amazon warehouse workers with “lost time” injuries in 2023 used 52 percent more time away from work on average than their peers at Amazon (45 days vs. 30 days). And Amazon workers with “lost time” cases spent more than 2.6 times as long working a light duty assignment when they returned to work compared to their non-Amazon counterparts (31 days vs. 12 days). This pattern suggests that even for the most seriously injured workers, Amazon may be pushing workers to return to work early and using extended light duty assignments to do so, practices which could extend the amount of time workers need to heal from their injuries.³⁵

Amazon has faced cost pressures from workers compensation insurance as the scope of its injury problems has become clearer. Washington state officials announced that, beginning in 2021, it would create a new category of workers compensation premiums largely for Amazon fulfillment centers after state officials determined the company's facilities were more dangerous than other warehouses and that Amazon's high injury rate was driving up costs for the entire warehouse industry.³⁶ Since 2021, workers compensation premium rates in the category that includes Amazon warehouses have now increased by 78 percent based on the company's higher rate of workers compensation claims—while the premium costs for

other warehouses in WA state dropped by 13 percent.³⁷

Amazon has internally acknowledged that its policy of shifting more injured workers into light duty will help the company lower costs. As *Reveal* reported in its 2020 exposé, the safety director for Amazon's robotic warehouses stated in an internal 2019 email that if the temporary light duty policy were rolled out across all fulfillment centers, it had "the potential to reduce Lost Time Injuries and workers compensation costs by 70 percent."³⁸

FIGURE 6: AVERAGE LIGHT DUTY AND LOST TIME DAYS BY CASE TYPE AT AMAZON AND NON-AMAZON WAREHOUSES, 2023



ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES DEEPEN AND EXPAND THEIR PROBES

By the time Jeff Bezos assured Amazon shareholders in 2021 that the company would become the “Earth’s Safest Employer,” Amazon was already facing exceptional scrutiny from federal and state OSHA agencies. Two weeks after Bezos’ letter to shareholders, Washington State OSHA (WISHA) issued the first of its broad-ranging violations to one of Amazon’s largest warehouses in its home state and has opened up additional investigations in the years since.³⁹ Federal OSHA then opened new inspections in 2022 across the nation, joined by the U.S. Justice Department’s U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of NY (DOJ).⁴⁰

Since 2020, federal and state OSHA inspectors have issued 69 violations involving ergonomic hazards, missing injury records and other related problems at 27 Amazon facilities in 13 states. They include 15 willful violations in Washington, which OSHA issues when companies are found to be “knowingly fail[ing] to comply with a legal requirement” or operating with “plain indifference to employee safety.”⁴¹ Federal OSHA has active investigations underway at 11 Amazon warehouses in eight states, of which seven are in response to complaints from Amazon’s own workers.⁴² Four years after the start of these major investigations into Amazon’s safety performance, these enforcement probes appear to be deepening and expanding as the company continues to deny the problem.⁴³



NEW OSHA INVESTIGATIONS

In 2023, fast on the heels of its 2022 enforcement actions in five states regarding ergonomic hazards, Federal OSHA opened new investigations of ergonomic hazards and later issued violations at three additional warehouses in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.⁴⁴ OSHA also issued new violations for Amazon's failure to keep accurate injury records at five warehouses in New Jersey, Delaware, New York, Pennsylvania and Missouri.⁴⁵ As SOC noted in a previous report, OSHA's citations of the company for incomplete injury records reveal the weaknesses in the company's management of its basic worker safety functions and raise questions about whether injury rates at Amazon may be even higher than those suggested by the data the company reports to OSHA.⁴⁶

Following its five previous investigations showing 16 violations, Washington State OSHA (WISHA) also opened a new inspection at Amazon's massive 2,400-employee Spokane, WA fulfillment center and in August 2023 it issued four additional "willful" violations for ergonomic hazards, reporting that the Spokane warehouse "has the highest injury rates for all Amazon fulfillment centers in the state."⁴⁷



Perhaps more than any other company, Amazon has the means and the know-how to invest in solutions that keep their workers safe."⁴⁸

- Craig Blackwood,
Washington State
OSHA

NEW PUSH BY FEDERAL OSHA TO DEMAND CORPORATEWIDE SAFETY SOLUTIONS

Amazon famously collects huge amounts of data about its operations and workers and uses that data to exercise a high level of control over what happens in its facilities.⁴⁹ Federal OSHA is seeking to use Amazon's central control of its vast operations to hold the company accountable for systematic changes to improve safety for all of its workers, not just those in facilities that OSHA has inspected.

In Amazon's 10 pending appeals of the violations already issued by Federal OSHA, OSHA officials have told the judge both that the violations across these multiple locations are very similar and that "internal ergonomic assessments conducted or commissioned by

Amazon have identified similar hazards at multiple other Amazon locations."⁵⁰

OSHA has also concluded that these commonly-found hazards "are governed by safety and health policies developed and distributed by Amazon's corporate offices and staff," and has taken the virtually unprecedented step of demanding that company should therefore be forced to fix these pervasive hazards across the entire chain of Amazon logistics operations.⁵¹ If OSHA succeeds at its efforts to force Amazon to fix safety problems across the company, it could prevent tens of thousands of worker injuries every year and set a new standard for how large employers must handle pervasive workplace hazards.

NEW OSHA VIOLATIONS EXPOSE MEDICAL MISMANAGEMENT BY AMAZON'S AMCARE CLINICS

Amazon's internal Amcare "medical clinics" are the first place that injured workers go to seek help, but too often, after workers report such injuries, the EMTs who staff these clinics push them to return to work rather than providing needed medical care.⁵²

The pattern of severe medical mismanagement by Amcare is not isolated or new. For over 8 years, both official OSHA investigations and media reporting have uncovered serious failures by the unsupervised paramedics whom Amazon uses to make actual medical decisions, make dangerously wrong determinations of employees' medical conditions and deny workers medical care required under state workers compensation law by "active[ly] obstruct[ing workers'] efforts to seek medical care."⁵³ OSHA has said such practi-

es appear to violate state medical licensing laws.⁵⁴ Recent OSHA investigations have repeatedly found serious problems with medical treatment occurring in Amazon warehouses. In 2022, OSHA investigated the medical practices at the Deltona, FL warehouse and found that "because [Amcare clinic staff] discourage workers from seeking medical treatment, many injuries progress."⁵⁵ And they are not limited to just one warehouse: another 2023 OSHA investigation at Amazon's STL8 warehouse in Missouri found that "Amazon used 'first aid' for prolonged periods, directing associates to return many times for acute injuries."⁵⁶ In 2023, among the 862 cases where injured workers were directed to return to Amazon's in-house clinic after first reporting an injury, "the [average] number of follow-up visits was between 20 and 21, thereby reflecting a delay in outside

referrals [for full medical evaluation] for many Amazon Associate (AA) injuries.”⁵⁷

In April 2023, OSHA issued a formal violation at a major Amazon warehouse in Albany, NY (ALB1) after it found that rather than timely referring injured workers to appropriate medical care, Amazon’s Amcare staff “returned injured workers to their regular jobs, which resulted in health outcomes such as . . . worsening of the injury, exacerbation of pain, and limited recovery from work-related injuries/illnesses”⁵⁸ The company’s prior knowledge of these serious medical failures was already well-established from years of OSHA investigations and warnings.

As OSHA stated in its press release:

“The agency put Amazon on notice previously about deficient on-site medical practices. OSHA issued a Hazard Alert Letter [to CEO Jeff Bezos] on this issue in January 2016 after an investigation at a Robbinsville, New Jersey, fulfillment facility. A similar warning was delivered to Amazon more recently—in January 2023—after OSHA identified deficiencies in on-site medical practices in Deltona, Florida.”⁵⁹

This was only the third time in OSHA’s 53-year history that OSHA has found a violation of the Act having to do with insufficient medical care, indicating that the facts at Amazon were extreme enough to justify such an enforcement action.⁶⁰

The practices that OSHA and Amazon workers have described at Amazon’s Amcare clinics are harmful to workers who may be pressured to return to work and exacerbate their injuries and they also hide the true scope of the injury crisis at the company by allowing Amazon to initially avoid recording the injuries in the first place. Any serious effort by Amazon to address its systemic injury problems must involve a redesign of Amcare.



AMAZON'S MISLEADING SAFETY STORY

Despite the scrutiny by federal and state regulators and elected officials, Amazon's response has been to minimize its workplace injury problem, deflect responsibility for the ongoing crisis and misinform stakeholders about its progress. SOC spotlighted these patterns in a July 2022 complaint to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regarding the company's repeated false and misleading statements about worker safety.⁶¹

In March 2024, Amazon released another public report meant to burnish its image on safety, in which it deployed many of the same strategies to give readers the misleading impression that Amazon's dangerous warehouses are becoming safer and are nearly as safe as competitors' warehouses.⁶²

Amazon again chose to compare its injury rates against skewed, outdated and misleading industry averages. The company's safety report uses warehouse industry injury data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), which is an inappropriate benchmark for at least three reasons. First, BLS's data is released nine months after the end of the year that it is based on, meaning that Amazon is comparing its own performance in 2023 to industry performance data from 2022.

Second, Amazon chose not to compare its performance with the lower overall BLS warehouse injury rate (5.7/100) but to instead benchmark its performance against the substantially higher rate BLS reports for estab-

lishments (individual locations) with more than 1,000 employees (6.8/100).⁶³ A recent analysis by the National Employment Law Project (NELP) found that Amazon accounts for 79 percent of the total employment in warehouses with 1,000 or more employees, heavily skewing any BLS figures calculated at the industry level.⁶⁴

Third, Amazon is comparing its performance against BLS industry averages that are warped by Amazon's own high injury rates. In 2022, the year the most recent BLS injury data is based on, Amazon employed 36 percent of warehouse workers in the U.S. and was responsible for 53 percent of all serious injuries in the warehouse industry.⁶⁵ Therefore, using an industry average that includes Amazon's own data obscures the degree to which Amazon is a dangerous outlier from its peers. SOC's apples-to-apples comparison using appropriate industry benchmarks found that Amazon's serious injury rate in its warehouses remained more than double that of the rest of the warehouse sector in 2023, a fact that the company has entirely refused to acknowledge.

In addition to the BLS data issues, Amazon also chose to omit significant data points from its report that did not suit its preferred narrative. The company proudly touted a 75 percent reduction in the lost time injury rate for its U.S. operations from 2019 to 2023 but fails to mention that its overall rate of injuries resulting in light duty assignments increased

by 77 percent during the same period (2.7 per 100 workers in 2019 vs. 4.8 per 100 in 2023).⁶⁶ This is likely the outcome of the company's longstanding strategy, discussed earlier in this report, to discourage seriously injured workers from taking time off work to recover by redirecting them to "light duty" assignments in order to reduce its workers compensation costs, and it does not necessarily mean that the injuries are becoming less severe.

Amazon's latest safety report is part of the company's ongoing effort to give a false impression that it is committed to transparency and is serious about addressing its pervasive failures on worker safety. Based on its past record and ongoing behavior, stakeholders should seek independent data and analysis to assess the company's claims about safety.



CONCLUSION

Amazon is failing to keep its workers safe on the job, even three years after its leadership made bold proclamations about becoming the safest employer on the planet and cutting its injury rate in half by 2025.⁶⁷ SOC's analysis of Amazon's own injury data found that it continues to injure workers at dramatically higher rates than the rest of the warehouse industry and has failed to reduce its overall injury rate by even 2 percent since 2020.⁶⁸

SOC's analysis also found that Amazon's intense focus on production during peak sales periods produces huge spikes in injury levels, a dangerous pattern that—based on internal reports—management has apparently known about for several years but failed to mitigate.⁶⁹ Amazon's use of in-house "clinics" that send many injured workers back to work rather than providing appropriate medical care and the company's push for seriously injured workers to return to work on "light duty" assignments corresponds with those workers spending substantially more time recovering than their counterparts in the warehouse industry. In the context of these shortcomings, Amazon continues to put out a misleading narrative about how its safety performance is improving, ignoring the more than 36,000 serious injuries that workers in its facilities suffered in 2023.⁷⁰

In his final letter to shareholders as CEO in 2021, Jeff Bezos wrote that Amazon would not fail at improving safety because "we have never

failed when we set our minds to something."⁷¹ Looking at the company's safety performance and its executives' public statements, all indications suggest that Amazon's management has not in fact "set its mind" to reducing injuries in any meaningful way. Instead, company leaders speak regularly about how focused they are on breaking delivery speed records and cutting costs in its logistics network.⁷² Amazon has sought to present itself as a company that has seen the light on workplace safety and one that is willing to use its vast resources toward self-reform. The company's actual performance and behavior, however, show that Amazon's management is not willing to prioritize worker safety over production speed and profits. Therefore, organized workers, supported by consumers, shareholders, enforcement agencies and elected officials must act to force Amazon to treat its workers like human beings whose safety and well-being matter.

APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY

Unless otherwise noted, all data on hours worked, injury numbers and injury types are based on records from the annual summary data from OSHA Form 300A and from the detailed case adapted from OSHA Form 300 submitted by Amazon to OSHA through OSHA's Injury Tracking Application ("ITA"). Summary data for the years 2017 to 2023 and case detail data for 2023 are published by OSHA and are available at <https://www.osha.gov/Establishment-Specific-Injury-and-Illness-Data>. OSHA's release of detailed case data in 2023 marks the first instance of the agency making such information publicly available. The information included in the detailed case data not included in the summary files includes the dates for each incident and the number of days away, restricted or transferred (DART) resulting from each incident.

Injury rates including Total Recordable Injury Rate ("TRIR" or "Case Rate") and Serious Injury Rate (defined as any case involving DART) were calculated as aggregates, not simple averages, of the various rates at individual locations. Injury rates are reported as injuries per 100 employees. OSHA assumes that 2,000 employee-hours equals one full-time annual employee (FTE). In Figures 1 and 2, some of the labels for injury rates by case type do not sum to the total injury rates due to decimal rounding.

Injury counts and hours worked were summed before calculating rates to ensure that rates were properly weighted and not skewed by smaller facilities. We use the term "injuries" to include both those cases recorded by Amazon as "injuries" and those recorded by Amazon as meeting OSHA's definition of work-related "illnesses." Work-related "illnesses" account

for less than three percent of cases during the period covered by this analysis and include heat-related conditions, skin diseases, respiratory conditions and poisoning, among others.

In the 2016 data set, only three Amazon facilities reported injury information through OSHA's public Injury Tracking Application (ITA). Based on a database compiled by the supply chain consulting firm MWPVL, there appear to have been as many as 176 Amazon facilities in operation that year (https://www.mwpvl.com/html/amazon_com.html). Because Amazon failed to report for the vast majority of its facilities in 2016, we are unable to include that data in this analysis. Amazon's reports for 2017-2023, however, appear to be largely consistent with the list maintained by MWPVL.

This analysis is limited to Amazon's warehousing and logistics operation, so facilities that Amazon reported operated under manufacturing NAICS codes (323117, 333992 and 334111) and retail trade NAICS codes (445110 and 455219) are not included in the analysis.

When reporting data to the ITA for 2021, Amazon re-classified 393 facilities it had previously reported as operating in the General Warehouse and Storage NAICS Code (493110) as operating in the Couriers and Express Delivery Service NAICS Code (492110). Because there was no discernable change in the work processes at these facilities and because this reclassification would make year-over-year comparisons of Amazon's safety performance challenging, for the purposes of this analysis, all Amazon warehouse and logistics operations that were classified in previous years as in the General Warehouse and Storage indus-

try (NAICS 493110) were included in the 2021 and 2022 analyses of Amazon’s overall injury rates. Comparison between Amazon’s injury rates and those of all other employers in the warehousing industry was done between the facilities that Amazon categorized in NAICS 493110 and all other employers reporting facilities under that NAICS code. In SOC’s “In Denial: Amazon’s Continuing Failure to Fix Its Injury Crisis,” the injury rate for non-Amazon employers was calculated as 4.1 in 2022. That figure was calculated based on the data submitted to OSHA through March 4, 2023. The figure in this report includes an additional 374 records submitted to OSHA through December 27, 2023. The additional data changes the total injury rate from 4.1 to 4.2 injuries per 100 FTEs.

ITA data includes annual average employment and hours worked by all employees at each facility per year. In its data validation and documentation instructions, OSHA states that each establishment’s “total hours worked” divided by “annual average employment” should not exceed 8,760 hours.⁷³ This analysis excludes any facility record that exceeded the threshold.⁷⁴

APPENDIX B: AMAZON INJURY DATA

Table 1 below includes a summary of injury, facility and employment data reported by Amazon to OSHA regarding its warehouse and logistics facilities for the years 2017 through 2023. Warehouse and logistics facilities are defined for the purpose of this analysis as those the company

categorized in the general warehouse and storage NAICS Code (493110) and the couriers and express delivery service NAICS Code (492110).

TABLE 1: TOTAL INJURIES REPORTED BY AMAZON FACILITIES BY TYPE, 2017-2023

Year	Annual Average Employees	Full-time Equivalent Employees	Lost Time Cases	Lost Time Days	Light Duty Cases	Light Duty Days	Total Other Cases	Total Cases
2017	200,828	150,684	7,626	480,045	2,171	199,417	1,476	11,273
2018	221,951	171,470	9,432	492,911	2,389	233,354	1,632	13,453
2019	630,048	236,013	11,995	630,106	6,429	466,498	2,834	21,258
2020	583,223	420,125	11,084	510,701	13,905	904,625	2,708	27,697
2021	566,736	487,848	11,839	586,732	22,162	1,509,145	4,333	38,334
2022	716,688	555,644	9,326	387,425	27,161	1,640,422	2,122	38,609
2023	742,654	590,481	8,084	251,031	28,086	1,727,013	2,178	38,348


ENDNOTES

1. Jeff Bezos. "2020 Letter to Shareholders." April 15, 2021. Accessed via: <https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/company-news/2020-letter-to-shareholders>; "From Body Mechanics to Mindfulness, Amazon Launches Employee-Designed Health and Safety Program called WorkingWell Across U.S. Operations," May 17, 2021. Accessed via: <https://press.aboutamazon.com/2021/5/from-body-mechanics-to-mindfulness-amazon-launches-employee-designed-health-and-safety-program-called-workingwell-across-u-s-operations#:~:text=By%20the%20end%20of%202021,has%20been%20since%20day%20one.>
2. SOC analysis of injury and facility data submitted by Amazon to OSHA for 2023, see Appendix A for methodology.
3. *Ibid.*
4. SOC analysis of injury and facility data submitted by Amazon to OSHA for 2023 found 36,170 serious injuries at Amazon. 525,600 minutes in a year divided by 36,170 serious injuries equals one serious injury on average every 14.5 minutes.
5. OSHA Hazard Alert Letter to Amazon STL8, St. Peters, MO, Jan. 26, 2024.
6. SOC analysis of injury and facility data submitted by Amazon to OSHA for 2023, see Appendix A for methodology.
7. *Ibid.*
8. During the weeks of July 9, October 8, and November 26, Amazon reported a total of 2,296 serious injuries, while non-Amazon employers reported 1,207. See SOC analysis of injury and facility data submitted by Amazon to OSHA for 2023, See Appendix A for methodology.
9. SOC analysis of injury and facility data submitted by Amazon to OSHA for 2023, see Appendix A for methodology.
10. Jeff Bezos. "2020 Letter to Shareholders." April 15, 2021. Accessed via: <https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/company-news/2020-letter-to-shareholders>
11. Andy Jassy. "2021 Letter to Shareholders." April 14, 2022. Accessed via: <https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/company-news/2021-letter-to-shareholders>
12. Andy Jassy. "2023 Letter to Shareholders." April 14, 2024. Accessed via: <https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/company-news/amazon-ceo-andy-jassy-2023-letter-to-shareholders>
13. The number of facilities is based on the number of establishment-specific records that Amazon reported to OSHA for 2017 through 2023. SOC analysis of injury and facility data submitted by Amazon to OSHA for 2023, See Appendix A for methodology.
14. SOC analysis of injury and facility data submitted by Amazon to OSHA for 2023, see Appendix A for methodology.
15. *Ibid.*
16. AMAZON.COM, INC. v. ATTORNEY GENERAL LETITIA JAMES, Case 1:21-cv-00767, Complaint, paragraphs .63-64. See also: Id.; Annie Palmer. "Amazon has resumed policies that penalize workers for taking too many breaks, just in time for Prime Day." CNBC. Oct. 14, 2020. Accessed via: <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/14/amazon-resumes-policy-that-dings-workers-for-taking-too-many-breaks.html>. See also: "Amazon makes tiny tweak to 'time off task' policy following report on high injury rates." Workplace Fairness. June 2, 2021. Accessed via: <https://www.workplacefairness.org/blog/2021/06/02/amazon-makes-tiny-tweak-totime-off-task-policy-following-report-on-high-injury-rates/>.
17. SOC analysis of injury and facility data submitted by Amazon to OSHA for 2023, see Appendix A for methodology.
18. "The first day of Prime Day was the single largest sales day ever on Amazon, helping make this the biggest Prime Day event ever." Amazon. July 13, 2023. Accessed via: <https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/retail/amazon-prime-day-2023-stats>
19. Isobel Asher Hamilton and Áine Cain. "Amazon warehouse employees speak out about the 'brutal' reality of working during the holidays, when 60-hour weeks are mandatory and ambulance calls are common." Business Insider. February 19, 2019. Accessed via: <https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-employees-describe-peak-2019-2>; Sara Ashley O'Brien. "What it's really like to be an Amazon warehouse worker during Prime Day." CNN Business. June 21, 2021. Accessed via: <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/06/21/tech/workers-amazon-prime-day>; Jules Roscoe. "'Grueling': Amazon Workers Describe What It's Like Working Peak Season." Vice. December 15, 2022. Accessed via: <https://www.vice.com/en/article/wxna3q/grueling-amazon-workers-describe-what-its-like-working-peak-season>
20. In 2023, OSHA began requiring employers to submit data on individual injury cases, in addition to the summary injury data that the agency has collected and made public previously. In April 2024, OSHA released an anonymized version of the individual case data that employers, including Amazon, had submitted. These case-level data allowed the SOC to analyze the timing of injuries during the year, using the date of each individual injury case.
21. SOC analysis of injury and facility data submitted by Amazon to OSHA for 2023, see Appendix A for methodology.

22. *Ibid.* See also: "Amazon Prime Day is back July 11-12! Here are 5 shopping tips to help you prepare." Amazon. June 21, 2023. Accessed via: [https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/retail/amazon-prime-day-2023-date](https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/retail/amazon-prime-day-2023-date;);"Prime Big Deal Days: Everything you need to know about Amazon's 48-hour shopping event." Amazon. October 13, 2023. Accessed via: <https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/retail/amazon-prime-big-deal-days-faq>. "'Tis the Season for Millions of Early Holiday Deals During Prime Big Deal Days." Amazon. October 5, 2023. Accessed via: <https://press.aboutamazon.com/2023/10/tis-the-season-for-millions-of-early-holiday-deals-during-prime-big-deal-days>. "Everything you need to know about Amazon's Black Friday sale 2023, including how to get the best deals." Amazon. November 24, 2023. Accessed via: <https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/retail/when-is-black-friday-2023>; Amazon extended holiday returns policy for 2023 included in "About our returns policies." Accessed via: <https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=GKM69DUUYKQWKWX7>
23. SOC analysis of injury and facility data submitted by Amazon to OSHA for 2023, see Appendix A for methodology.
24. *Ibid.*
25. Will Evans. "How Amazon hid its safety crisis." Reveal. September 29, 2020. Accessed via: <https://revealnews.org/article/how-amazon-hid-its-safety-crisis/> ; Zoe Malin. "Amazon Prime Day: Everything you've ever wanted to know about the mega sale" NBC News, June 7 2021. Accessed via: <https://www.nbcnews.com/select/shopping/amazon-prime-day-history-ncna1269819>
26. Will Evans. "How Amazon hid its safety crisis." Reveal. Sept. 29, 2020. Accessed via: <https://revealnews.org/article/how-amazon-hid-its-safety-crisis/>
27. "Amazon's Prime Big Deal Days Was the Company's Largest Two-Day October Holiday Kick-off Event Ever." Amazon. October 12, 2023. Accessed via: <https://press.aboutamazon.com/2023/10/amazons-prime-big-deal-days-was-the-companys-largest-two-day-october-holiday-kick-off-event-ever>
28. SOC analysis of injury and facility data submitted by Amazon to OSHA for 2023, see Appendix A for methodology.
29. Will Evans. "How Amazon hid its safety crisis." Reveal. Sept. 29, 2020. Accessed via: <https://revealnews.org/article/how-amazon-hid-its-safety-crisis/>. See also: "Delivered with Care." Amazon. March 14, 2023. p.8. Accessed via: <https://cdn-safety.aboutamazon.com/ea/c3/d72d03394d0db22e336048031ec8/amazon-safety-report-2022-v41.pdf>
30. Will Evans. "How Amazon hid its safety crisis." Reveal. Sept. 29, 2020. Accessed via: <https://revealnews.org/article/how-amazon-hid-its-safety-crisis/>
31. "Primed for Pain." The Strategic Organizing Center. May 2021. pg. 14. Accessed via: <https://thesoc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/PrimedForPain.pdf>
32. Sara Rhoads. "Amazon's safety performance continues to improve year over year." Amazon. March 8, 2024. Accessed via: <https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/workplace/amazon-workplace-safety-post-2023>
33. SOC analysis of injury and facility data submitted by Amazon to OSHA for 2023, see Appendix A for methodology.
34. *Ibid.*
35. *Ibid.*
36. Katherine Long. "Workers' comp rates to jump in Amazon's Washington fulfillment centers due to hazards." The Seattle Times. Dec. 1, 2020. Accessed via: <https://www.seattletimes.com/business/amazon/amazons-workers-comp-rates-to-jump-15-due-to-hazardous-conditions-at-its-fulfillment-centers-state-agency-says/>
37. See "LNI premium rates 2020-2024," C5 and C4. Accessed via: <https://lni.wa.gov/insurance/rates-risk-classes/rates-for-workers-compensation/>
38. Will Evans. "How Amazon hid its safety crisis." Reveal. Sept. 29, 2020. Accessed via: <https://revealnews.org/article/how-amazon-hid-its-safety-crisis/>
39. Washington State OSHA Citation: 317961850, Dupont WA, May 4, 2021; Mike Lewis. "Washington state regulators say Amazon's workflow and pace injures warehouse workers." GeekWire. May 25, 2021. Accessed via: <https://www.geekwire.com/2021/state-regulators-say-amazons-workflow-pace-injures-warehouse-workers/> See also: "Inspection Detail: Amazon Com Services LLC – Inspections: 1649120.015 | 1641168.015 | 1576001.015 | 1546082.015 | 1540096.015 | 1503638.015." Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Accessed via: https://www.osha.gov/ords/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=1649120.015&id=1641168.015&id=1576001.015&id=1546082.015&id=1540096.015&id=1503638.015, as of April 30, 2024
40. Annie Palmer. "Amazon faces probe by federal prosecutors and OSHA into warehouse safety." CNBC. July 18, 2022. Accessed via: <https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/18/amazon-faces-probe-by-federal-prosecutors-osha-into-warehouse-safety.html>
41. Federal violations: 49 violations at 23 facilities in 12 states: https://www.osha.gov/ords/imis/establishment.search?establishment=Amazon&state=all&officetype=fed&office=all&sitezip=100000&startmonth=01&startday=01&startyear=2020&endmonth=04&endday=30&endyear=2024&p_case=all&p_violations_exist=yes&p_start=&p_finish=0&p_sort=12&p_desc=DESC&p_direction=Next&p_show=25
WA State violations: 18 violations at 4 locations, including 15 "Willful" violations: https://www.osha.gov/ords/imis/establishment.search?p_logger=1&establishment=Amazon&State=WA&officetype=state&Office=all&sitezip=&p_case=all&p_violations_exist=yes&startmonth=01&startday=01&startyear=2020&endmonth=04&end

42. "Inspection Detail: Amazon Fulfillment Center – Inspections: 1742331.015 | 1741817.015 | 1741729.015 | 1736132.015 | 1736084.015 | 1736477.015 | 1733336.015 | 1730276.015 | 1725351.015 | 1721378.015 | 1716583.015 | 1712043.015 | 1712060.015 | 1712572.015." Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Accessed via: https://www.osha.gov/ords/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=1741817.015&id=1741729.015&id=1742331.015&id=1736132.015&id=1736084.015&id=1736477.015&id=1733336.015&id=1730276.015&id=1725351.015&id=1721378.015&id=1716583.015&id=1712043.015&id=1712060.015&id=1712572.015
43. Katie Tarasov. "Amazon's worker safety hazards come under fire from regulators and the DOJ." CNBC. April 15, 2023. Accessed via: <https://www.cnbc.com/2023/04/15/osha-cites-amazon-for-unsafe-warehouses-as-injury-numbers-remain-high.html>; See also: "Joint Scheduling Recommendations Regarding Hearing Dates And Locations." US Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Dkt. #23-0298 et al.
44. "Establishment Search Results: Establishment: Amazon, Inspection Date Range: 07/08/2022 to 08/30/2022, All OSHA offices, All zip codes, All states." Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Accessed via: https://www.osha.gov/ords/imis/establishment.search?p_logger=1&establishment=Amazon&State=all&officetype=fed&Office=all&sitezip=&p_case=all&p_violations_exist=yes&startmonth=07&startday=08&startyear=2022&endmonth=08&endday=30&endyear=2022; new violations issued in 2023 are shown in rows number 59, 61 and 64. Accessed via: https://www.osha.gov/ords/imis/establishment.search?establishment=Amazon&state=all&officetype=fed&office=all&sitezip=100000&startmonth=01&startday=01&startyear=2020&endmonth=04&endday=30&endyear=2024&p_case=all&p_violations_exist=yes&p_start=&p_finish=0&p_sort=12&p_desc=DESC&p_direction=Next&p_show=25
45. "Establishment Search Results: Establishment: Amazon, Inspection Date Range: 01/01/2023 to 03/01/2024, All OSHA offices, All zip codes, All states." Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Accessed via: https://www.osha.gov/ords/imis/establishment.search?p_logger=1&establishment=Amazon.com&State=all&officetype=fed&Office=all&sitezip=&p_case=all&p_violations_exist=all&startmonth=01&startday=01&startyear=2023&endmonth=03&endday=01&endyear=2024
46. "In Denial: Amazon's Continuing Failure to Fix Its Injury Crisis," The Strategic Organizing Center. April 2023. pg. 11. Accessed via: <https://thesoc.org/what-we-do/in-denial-amazons-continuing-failure-to-fix-its-injury-crisis/>; See also: OSHA inspections: 1689644, 1686123 and 1677347.
47. "Inspection Detail: Amazon Com Services Llc – Inspections: 1649120.015 | 1641168.015 | 1576001.015 | 1546082.015 | 1540096.015 | 1503638.015." Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Accessed via: https://www.osha.gov/ords/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=1649120.015&id=1641168.015&id=1576001.015&id=1546082.015&id=1540096.015&id=1503638.015 See also: "Another Amazon fulfillment center cited for unsafe conditions." Washington State Department of Labor & Industries. August 16, 2023. Accessed via: <https://www.lni.wa.gov/news-events/article/23-19>; See also: "Inspection Detail: Inspection Nr: 1695075.015 – Wa317975818 – Amazon Com Services Llc." Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 2023, Accessed via: https://www.osha.gov/ords/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=1695075.015&id=1683573.015&id=1676136.015&id=1649120.015
48. "Another Amazon fulfillment center cited for unsafe conditions." Washington State Department of Labor & Industries. August 16, 2023. Accessed via: <https://www.lni.wa.gov/news-events/article/23-19>
49. Christopher Mims. "The Way Amazon Uses Tech to Squeeze Performance Out of Workers Deserves Its Own Name: Bezosism." Wall Street Journal. September 11, 2021. Accessed via: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-way-amazon-uses-tech-to-squeeze-performance-out-of-workers-deserves-its-own-name-bezosism-11631332821>
50. OSHA "Complaint," Su vs Amazon Services, US Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, Dkt. 23-0195, Para. XII, April 13, 2023.
51. "Amazon's fulfillment centers, sortation centers, delivery stations, and XL sites are governed by safety and health policies developed and distributed by Amazon's corporate offices and staff." OSHA "Complaint," Su vs Amazon.com, US Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, P. 3, Dkt. 23-0195, April 23, 2023. See also: OSHA has asked the judge to "direct[] Amazon's corporate management to maintain and utilize safety and health programs and/or policies that protect workers from ergonomic lifting hazards, specifically monitoring and ensuring its locations are adhering to the programs." OSHA "Complaint," Su vs Amazon Services, US Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, P. 4, Dkt. 23-0195, April 13, 2023.
52. Will Evans. "How Amazon hid its safety crisis." Reveal. Sept. 29, 2020. Accessed via: <https://revealnews.org/article/how-amazon-hid-its-safety-crisis/>; Caitlin Harrington. "How Amazon's In-House First Aid Clinics Push Injured Employees to Keep Working." Wired. Aug. 16 2023. Accessed via: <https://www.wired.com/story/amazons-first-aid-clinics-push-injured-employees-to-keep-working/>

53. OSHA letter to Jeff Bezos, Jan. 6, 2016; H. Claire Brown. "How Amazon's On-Site Emergency Care Endangers the Warehouse Workers It's Supposed to Protect." *The Intercept*. Dec. 2, 2019. Accessed via: <https://theintercept.com/2019/12/02/amazon-warehouse-workers-safety-cyber-monday/>; "How Amazon Hit Its Safety Crisis." *Reveal*. Sept. 29, 2020 Accessed via: <https://www.revealnews.org/article/how-amazon-hid-its-safety-crisis/>; OSHA letter to Amazon MCO2, Deltona, FL, Jan. 17, 2023, p. 2; "How Amazon's In-House First Aid Clinics Push Injured Employees to Keep Working." *Wired*. Aug. 16, 2023. Accessed via: <https://www.wired.com/story/amazons-first-aid-clinics-push-injured-employees-to-keep-working/>
54. OSHA letter to Amazon MCO2, Deltona, FL, Jan. 17, 2023, p. 2.
55. OSHA Hazard Alert Letter to Amazon MCO2, Deltona, FL, p. 2.
56. OSHA Hazard Alert Letter to Amazon STL8, St. Peters, MO, Jan. 26, 2024, p. 1.
57. OSHA Hazard Alert Letter to Amazon STL8, St. Peters, MO, Jan. 26, 2024, p.1.
58. "Violation Detail: Inspection Nr: 1610874.015." Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 2023. Accessed via: https://www.osha.gov/ords/imis/establishment.violation_detail?id=1610874.015&citation_id=02002
59. "OSHA National News Release: US Department of Labor finds Amazon failed to provide injured employees proper medical treatment at Castleton, New York, fulfillment facility." Occupational Safety and Health Administration. April 28, 2023. Accessed via: <https://www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/national/04282023>
60. "Key Issues Key Issues Affecting Medical Services at the Workplace." Presented at the American Bar Association OSH Law Committee. March 2, 2018.
61. "Request for an investigation of Amazon.com, Inc.'s false and misleading health and safety disclosures." The Strategic Organizing Center. July 2022. Accessed via: https://thesoc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/SOC-to-SEC-re-Amazon-complaint-220707_FINAL.pdf
62. Sarah Rhoads. "Amazon's safety performance continues to improve year over year." Amazon. March 8, 2024. Accessed via: <https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/workplace/amazon-workplace-safety-post-2023>
63. BLS 2022 industrywide injury data, Accessed via: <https://www.bls.gov/iif/nonfatal-injuries-and-illnesses-tables/table-1-injury-and-illness-rates-by-industry-2022-national.htm>; detailed by establishment size in file "quartile-table-1-total-recordable-cases-2022-national", referenced figure in cell B3865.
64. National Employment Law Project. "Amazon's Outsized Role: The Injury Crisis in U.S. Warehouses and a Policy Roadmap to Protect Workers." May 2024. Page 3. Accessed via: <https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2024/04/Amazons-Outsized-Role-5-1-24.pdf>
65. "In Denial: Amazon's Continuing Failure to Fix Its Injury Crisis." The Strategic Organizing Center. April 2023. pg. 2. Accessed via: <https://thesoc.org/what-we-do/in-denial-amazons-continuing-failure-to-fix-its-injury-crisis/>. See also: SOC analysis of injury and facility data submitted by Amazon to OSHA for 2023, See Appendix A for methodology.
66. "Delivered with Care." Amazon. March. 14, 2023. p.10. Accessed via: <https://cdn-safety.aboutamazon.com/ea/c3/d72d03394d0db22e336048031ec8/amazon-safety-report-2022-v41.pdf>
67. Musadiq Bidar. "Bezos vows to make Amazon "Earth's Best Employer,"" CBS News. April 16, 2021. Accessed via: <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/jeff-bezos-amazon-employee-care/>; "Amazon.com Announces First Quarter Results." Amazon.com. Apr. 29, 2021. Accessed via: <https://ir.aboutamazon.com/news-release/news-release-details/2021/Amazon.com-Announces-First-Quarter-Results/default.aspx>
68. SOC analysis of injury and facility data submitted by Amazon to OSHA for 2023, see Appendix A for methodology.
69. SOC analysis of injury and facility data submitted by Amazon to OSHA for 2023, see Appendix A for methodology. See also: Will Evans. "How Amazon hid its safety crisis." *Reveal*. Sept. 29, 2020. Accessed via: <https://revealnews.org/article/how-amazon-hid-its-safety-crisis/>
70. SOC analysis of injury and facility data submitted by Amazon to OSHA for 2023, see Appendix A for methodology.
71. Jeff Bezos. "2020 Letter to Shareholders." April 15, 2021. Accessed via: <https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/company-news/2020-letter-to-shareholders>
72. Andy Jassy. "2023 Letter to Shareholders." April 14, 2024. Accessed via: <https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/company-news/amazon-ceo-andy-jassy-2023-letter-to-shareholders>
73. "Injury Tracking Application CSV Documentation." The Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Accessed via: https://www.osha.gov/sites/default/files/osha_ita-estab-and-summary-csv-documentation_revised.pdf
74. Due to this change in the methodology for the analysis in this report, ITA figures for Amazon for 2017 in Appendix B, and for "Other" injury rate for non-Amazon facilities in 2021 vary slightly from figures published in SOC's previous reports.



**STRATEGIC
ORGANIZING
CENTER**

