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# Failure to Deliver



Amazon Falls  
Short on Safety

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# FAILURE TO DELIVER

## Amazon Falls Short on Safety

### ABOUT THE STRATEGIC ORGANIZING CENTER

The Strategic Organizing Center (SOC) is a mission-focused center developing strategies and implementing tactics on transformational campaigns that confront corporate power. We partner with workers and our affiliates—the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), Communication Workers of America (CWA), and the United Farmworkers of America (UFW)—who are united in building a strong, vibrant labor movement through organizing workers hungry for change. The SOC acts with workers and unions driving strategies and tactics that support many of the largest organizing initiatives being conducted in the United States today.

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## INTRODUCTION

Four years ago, Amazon announced that it would cut its injury rate in half by 2025 and become “Earth’s Safest Place to Work.”<sup>1</sup> As of 2024, the company’s injury rate remains more than 80% higher than its goal, and its serious injury rate is nearly twice as high as its warehouse industry peers. Amazon’s injury data also show that in 2024, nearly 4 in 10 (38%) Amazon workers in the U.S. worked in facilities where the recordable injury rate actually increased between 2023 and 2024. These data show a near-total failure on the part of Amazon’s management to address its injury crisis.

The Strategic Organizing Center (SOC) analyzed the injury data that Amazon submitted to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and found that Amazon’s overall injury rate in 2024 was 6.0 injuries per 100 workers.<sup>2</sup> In 2020, the last full year of injury data before Amazon announced its plan to reduce its injury rate by 50%, Amazon’s overall injury rate was 6.6 per 100 workers. In the four years since Amazon Founder Jeff Bezos announced the goal of becoming “Earth’s Safest Place to Work,” Amazon has succeeded in reducing its overall injury rate by only 10%. Amazon is not realistically on track to meet its target of cutting its total injury rate in half by 2025.

Amazon’s warehouse operations continue to be dramatically more dangerous for workers than the rest of the industry. In 2024, the serious injury rate at Amazon warehouses was 5.9 per 100 workers—almost double the rate at non-Amazon warehouses (3.0 per 100).<sup>3</sup> While Amazon employed 39% of all U.S. warehouse workers in 2024, the company was responsible for more than half (56%) of all serious injuries in the industry.<sup>4</sup>

In Amazon CEO Andy Jassy’s first letter to shareholders in 2022, he said he would not be satisfied without “transformational results” on safety.<sup>5</sup> Three years later, with injury data that show the company is nowhere near transforming its safety conditions, Mr. Jassy’s 2025 letter to shareholders failed to mention workplace safety even once, instead focusing on the need to invest in AI and deliver packages at ever-faster speeds.<sup>6</sup> Mr. Jassy is proud to talk about Amazon’s corporate culture that supposedly encourages employees to disagree and ask “why,” but does not offer an answer for the most obvious question suggested by its injury data: **“why does a company with all of Amazon’s resources keep failing to keep its workers safe on the job?”**

## QUICK FACTS




## OVERVIEW OF AMAZON'S INJURY DATA

SOC's analysis is based on data that Amazon and other employers provided to OSHA annually from 2020 to 2024. All employers are legally required to submit annual injury and illness reports to OSHA for any warehouse, delivery, grocery or wholesale trade facility with 20 or more employees. Amazon reported injury and illness information for 1,172 warehouse, logistics and delivery facilities in 2024.<sup>7</sup> Those reports covered an average annual workforce of 819,757 in 2024.<sup>8</sup>

These reports show that each year, tens of thousands of Amazon workers are injured on the job. In 2024, there were 39,062 total recordable injuries and illnesses—defined as those requiring medical treatment beyond first aid or requiring time off a worker's regular job—at Amazon facilities.<sup>9</sup> **The vast majority of these were serious: 36,694, or 94%, of the injuries were categorized as either light duty or lost time injuries—that is, injuries where workers were hurt so badly that they were either unable to perform their regular job functions (light duty) or forced to miss work entirely (lost time).**<sup>10</sup> The methodology used to analyze the data and the number of cases and injuries by type are presented in Appendices A and B, respectively.

**FIGURE 1: INJURY RATES AT AMAZON FACILITIES, BY CASE TYPE, 2020 TO 2024**




As shown in Figure 1, Amazon did not make meaningful progress on its total rate of injuries or serious injuries from 2020 to 2024.<sup>11</sup> In 2024, the company's total injury rate was 6.0 injuries per 100 full-time equivalent workers (FTEs), down from 6.5 in 2023. This change was driven by a reduction of 0.2 lost-time cases and 0.3 light-duty cases per 100 workers.

SOC’s analysis of Amazon’s 2024 injury data also found that, while the company’s total reported injury rate decreased by 7.4%, this modest improvement was not evenly distributed throughout Amazon’s operations.<sup>12</sup> Of the 1,026 Amazon facilities that reported injury data in both 2023 and 2024, 396 facilities that employed 38% of Amazon’s full-time equivalent workers actually reported increases in their total injury rates in 2024.<sup>13</sup> **At the facilities reporting increases in injury rates, the total injury rate increased by 25% from 5.7 injuries per 100 workers to 7.1 per 100 workers.**<sup>14</sup> Amazon claimed that in 2024 it focused on “executing an effective strategy to improve safety across [its] global operations,” but this is inconsistent with the company’s own data that show nearly 4 in 10 of U.S. Amazon workers work in facilities where injury rates increased between 2023 and 2024.<sup>15</sup>

AMAZON’S WAREHOUSE INJURY RATE IS STILL FAR HIGHER THAN WAREHOUSE INDUSTRY

SOC also analyzed injury rates at the subset of 456 facilities categorized by Amazon under the General Warehouse and Storage industry (NAICS 493110) in its reports to OSHA for 2024 and compared the company’s performance with all non-Amazon warehouse facilities in the same year.<sup>16</sup> SOC’s analysis found that Amazon’s injury rate at its warehouses remains 66% higher than the rate at non-Amazon warehouses in 2024, and its rate of serious injuries is even worse—almost double the rate for non-Amazon warehouses (5.9 per 100 workers compared to 3.0 per 100 workers).<sup>17</sup>

FIGURE 2: INJURY RATES AT AMAZON AND NON-AMAZON WAREHOUSES BY CASE TYPE, 2023 AND 2024




## AMAZON FAILS TO ADDRESS INJURY SPIKES DURING PRIME DAYS AND HOLIDAY SHOPPING

Amazon has known about dramatic spikes in its injury levels during peak periods for many years and has failed to take meaningful steps to make its workplaces safe for workers during peak periods. For years, workers have spoken out about the mandatory overtime and intense production pressure that the company institutes during peak periods in order to satisfy huge order volumes at top speed.<sup>18</sup> Last year, both the SOC and the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) issued reports spotlighting the major spikes in injuries that occur around the company's busiest periods.<sup>19</sup>

SOC's analysis of Amazon's case-level injury reports for 2024 found that injury cases surged dramatically during the company's peak periods yet again.<sup>20</sup> SOC's analysis found three very stark spikes in injury levels during and immediately after Amazon's major sales events, which include Prime Day (July 16-17), Prime Big Deal Days (October 8-9), and the extended holiday season starting in November, peaking the week of Cyber Monday (December 2).<sup>21</sup> As shown in Figure 3, these spikes in 2024 replicated the same pattern of injury spikes from 2023. **When high injury periods are predictable, they are preventable, and the 2024 data show that Amazon has failed to take meaningful steps to prevent injuries during peak periods.**<sup>22</sup>

FIGURE 3: TOTAL SERIOUS INJURIES AT AMAZON FACILITIES PER WEEK, 2023 AND 2024



As shown in Figure 3, Amazon reported a substantial spike in injuries during the week of July 15, which included the company's signature Prime Day sales event on July 16-17. The 1,032 serious injuries the company recorded that week represented a 35% increase from the 770 serious injuries recorded in the previous week. During the week that Amazon held its Prime Big Deals Days on October 8-9, workers experienced a 21% surge over the previous week's serious injury total (792 during the week of 10/8 as compared to 655 in the week of 10/1). Following the early October spike, the holiday season saw a steady increase starting the week of October 29, until it reached a peak of 1,043 serious injuries during the week of December 1—a **staggering 52% increase from the beginning of the holiday shopping period and the highest weekly serious injury total for 2024 overall.**<sup>23</sup>



## AMAZON'S MISLEADING SAFETY STORY

In response to years of criticism of its safety record, Amazon's strategy has been to minimize its workplace injury problem, deflect responsibility for the ongoing crisis and misinform stakeholders about its progress. SOC spotlighted these patterns in a July 2022 complaint to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regarding the company's repeated false and misleading statements about worker safety.<sup>24</sup>

In March 2025, Amazon released another public report in which it deployed many of the same strategies to give readers the misleading impression that Amazon is making meaningful progress on improving safety in its operations.<sup>25</sup> Amazon again chose to compare its injury rates against skewed, outdated and misleading industry averages. The company's safety report chose not to compare its performance with the lower overall Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) warehouse injury rate (4.8/100) but to instead benchmark its performance against the higher rate BLS reports for establishments (individual locations) with more than 1,000 employees (5.4/100).<sup>26</sup> **In 2024, Amazon facilities accounted for 79% of the total employment in warehouses with 1,000 or more employees, heavily skewing any BLS figures calculated at the industry level.**<sup>27</sup> Amazon's choice to use industry averages that include its own injury rates obscures the degree to which it is an outlier in its industry. SOC's apples-to-apples comparison using appropriate industry benchmarks found that Amazon's serious injury rate in its warehouses remained almost double that of the rest of the warehouse sector in 2024 (5.9/100 workers vs. 3.0/100 for the non-Amazon warehouse industry), a fact that the company has entirely refused to acknowledge.

Amazon's latest safety report is part of the company's ongoing effort to give a false impression that it is committed to transparency and is serious about addressing its pervasive failures to prioritize worker safety. Based on its past record and ongoing behavior, stakeholders should seek independent data and analysis to assess the company's claims about safety.



Amazon's serious injury rate in its warehouses remained almost double that of the rest of the warehouse sector in 2024 (5.9/100 workers vs. 3.0/100 for the non-Amazon warehouse industry), a fact that the company has entirely refused to acknowledge.

## SENATE INVESTIGATION EXPOSES AMAZON'S KNOWLEDGE OF SAFETY CRISIS AND FAILURE TO ACT

Following an 18-month investigation, the US Senate HELP Committee chaired by Senator Bernie Sanders released a report in December 2024 detailing the uniquely dangerous conditions found in Amazon warehouses.<sup>28</sup> An interim report was also released in July 2024.<sup>29</sup> The investigation used publicly available data, internal Amazon documents and extensive interviews with workers to spotlight both the severity of the injury crisis at Amazon and the corporate practices that perpetuate dangerous conditions for Amazon workers.

The HELP committee's investigation report validated and expanded SOC's analysis of Amazon's injury data, finding that Amazon's obsession with productivity causes workers to get injured at high rates while performing the basic duties of their jobs.<sup>30</sup> While the company recently claimed to have made measurable progress in its workplace safety, the Committee's investigation found that Amazon workers were nearly twice as likely to be injured as workers in the rest of the warehousing industry from 2017-2023.<sup>31</sup> The Committee report also echoed SOC's longstanding position that Amazon publishes misleading information about its injury rates, using inappropriate and cherry-picked comparisons to minimize the perception of its injury crisis.<sup>32</sup>

The HELP Committee investigation found that Amazon fails to adequately record injuries for OSHA, including by refusing to refer workers to outside medical care, thus potentially rendering some workers' injuries un-recordable.<sup>33</sup> **HELP's December report revealed that Amazon internally keeps track of its total injury rate including injuries not reported to OSHA, and that there is a stark difference between Amazon's recordable injury rate it publicly reports and its actual total injury rate.**<sup>34</sup>



Amazon's obsession with productivity causes workers to get injured at high rates while performing the basic duties of their jobs.



Senator Sanders' July 2024 interim report built on SOC's findings regarding the impacts of Prime Day and the holiday season on spikes in injury rates at Amazon. The Committee reviewed internal reports from Amazon regarding injuries during peak seasons showing these weeks have yielded, by far, the highest weekly injury rates for Amazon warehouse workers.<sup>35</sup> **The documents also showed that Amazon warehouses have been regularly understaffed during Prime Day and the holiday season. For example, Amazon filled only 71% of its hiring needs during 2021's Prime Day season.**<sup>36</sup> These internal documents revealed by the Committee indicate that Amazon is fully aware of the injury issues in its warehouses and the relationship between peak periods and spikes in injuries.<sup>37</sup>

The HELP Committee revealed that in 2020, after Amazon relaxed production pressure to implement COVID safety measures, it saw a major decrease in injury rates.<sup>38</sup> The company commissioned internal studies to understand this decrease and the internal study team recommended that the company reform its production-related pressure to reduce injuries.<sup>39</sup> These recommendations were mostly rejected because Amazon leadership did not want to reduce production speed to increase safety.<sup>40</sup> The SOC spotlighted the likely relationship between Amazon's COVID protocols, reduced production pressure and reduced injury rates in 2021.<sup>41</sup> Amazon's apparent use of extensive internal data to accurately diagnose the factors contributing to its high injury rates and its refusal to do anything meaningful with this knowledge to protect its workers is a damning indictment of the company's public commitments to worker safety.



## CONCLUSION

Amazon is a company that prides itself on speed and an obsessive attention to data to measure its performance. Four years ago, the company announced a plan to cut its injury rate in half by 2025. SOC's analysis has found that the company is nowhere near meeting its target and that many facilities trended in the opposite direction between 2023 and 2024. Amazon has continued to put out a misleading narrative about how its safety performance is improving, ignoring the more than 39,000 injuries that workers in its facilities suffered in 2024 and the tragically predictable spikes in injuries produced by its peak sales periods.<sup>42</sup> In 2022, Amazon CEO Andy Jassy assured the company's shareholders that he would not be satisfied without "transformational results" on safety.<sup>43</sup> Three years later, it appears that the only thing that has transformed is Mr. Jassy's focus on solving Amazon's injury crisis. It is clear that Amazon's leadership cannot be trusted to act to protect workers unless and until they are forced to do so. For years, Amazon workers have led the way in spotlighting the safety crisis at Amazon. The company's continued failure to improve safety shows that Amazon workers' best path to safer jobs is to organize unions and bargain contracts that require Amazon to prioritize safety.

## APPENDIX A - METHODOLOGY

Unless otherwise noted, all data on hours worked, injury numbers and injury types are based on records from the annual summary data from OSHA Form 300A and from the detailed case adapted from OSHA Form 300 submitted by Amazon to OSHA through OSHA's Injury Tracking Application ("ITA"). Summary data for the years 2020 to 2024 and case detail data for 2023 and 2024 are published by OSHA and are available at <https://www.osha.gov/Establishment-Specific-Injury-and-Illness-Data>. Summary data is derived from OSHA Form 300A, which provides an annual summary of work-related injuries and illnesses, aggregated total number of hours worked at the facility, total number of cases, days away from work, job transfer or restriction. Detail case data includes detailed information from OSHA Forms 300 and 301, with the specific information about each incident reported to OSHA, including date, time, total number days away from work, job transfer or restriction (DART).

This analysis is limited to Amazon's warehousing and logistics operations, so facilities that Amazon reported operated under manufacturing NAICS codes (323117, 333992 and 334111) and retail trade NAICS codes (445110 and 455219) are not included in the analysis.

Injury counts and hours worked were summed before calculating rates to ensure that rates were properly weighted and not skewed by smaller facilities. We use the term "injuries" to include both those cases recorded by Amazon as "injuries" and those recorded by Amazon as meeting OSHA's definition of work-related "illnesses." Work-related "illnesses" account for less than 3% of cases during the period covered by this analysis and include heat-related conditions, skin diseases, respiratory conditions and poisoning, among others.

This analysis is limited to Amazon's warehousing and logistics operations, so facilities that Amazon reported operated under manufacturing NAICS codes (323117, 333992 and 334111) and retail trade NAICS codes (445110 and 455219) are not included in the analysis.

When reporting data to the ITA for 2021, Amazon re-classified 393 facilities it had previously reported as operating in the General Warehouse and Storage NAICS Code (493110) as operating in the Couriers and Express Delivery Service NAICS Code (492110). Because there was no discernable change in the work processes at these facilities and because this reclassification would make year-over-year comparisons of Amazon's safety performance challenging, for the purposes of this analysis, all Amazon warehouse and logistics operations that were classified in previous years as in the General Warehouse and Storage industry (NAICS 493110) were included in the 2021 and 2022 analyses of Amazon's overall injury rates. A comparison between Amazon's injury rates and those of all other employers in the warehousing industry was done between the facilities that Amazon categorized in NAICS 493110 and all other employers reporting facilities under that NAICS code.

ITA data includes annual average employment and hours worked by all employees at each facility per year. In its data validation and documentation instructions, OSHA states that each establishment's "total hours worked" divided by "annual average employment" should not exceed 8,760 hours. This analysis excludes any facility record that exceeded the threshold.

## APPENDIX B - AMAZON INJURY DATA

Appendix Table 1 below includes a summary of injury, facility and employment data reported by Amazon to OSHA regarding its warehouse and logistics facilities for the years 2020 through 2024. Warehouse and logistics facilities are defined for the purpose of this analysis as those the company categorized in the general warehouse and storage NAICS Code (493110) and the couriers and express delivery service NAICS Code (492110).

**APPENDIX TABLE 1: TOTAL INJURIES REPORTED BY AMAZON FACILITIES BY CASE TYPE, 2020 TO 2024**

Year	Annual Average Employees	Full-time Equivalents	Lost Time Cases	Lost Time Days	Light Duty Cases	Light Duty Days	Total Other Cases	Total Cases
2020	583,223	420,125	11,084	510,701	13,905	904,625	2,708	27,697
2021	566,736	487,848	11,839	586,732	22,162	1,509,145	4,333	38,334
2022	716,688	555,644	9,326	387,425	27,161	1,640,422	2,122	38,609
2023	742,406	590,481	8,083	251,020	28,086	1,727,013	2,178	38,347
2024	819,757	649,293	7,624	210,227	29,070	1,690,514	2,368	39,062

\* Figures for 2023 differ from those in SOC's 2024 Same-Day Injury report because updated data excludes three Amazon delivery service partner (DSP) facilities that were erroneously included. This analysis covers only Amazon's direct operations, not its DSPs. The removal of these facilities, which had a combined workforce of 248 and one recorded injury, had no impact on injury rates and does not change the conclusions or critique from last year's report.



## ENDNOTES

- 1 "From Body Mechanics to Mindfulness, Amazon Launches Employee-Designed Health and Safety Program called WorkingWell Across U.S. Operations," Amazon, May 17, 2021: <https://press.aboutamazon.com/2021/5/from-body-mechanics-to-mindfulness-amazon-launches-employee-designed-health-and-safety-program-called-workingwell-across-u-s-operations>.
- 2 SOC analysis of injury and facility data submitted by Amazon to OSHA for 2024, See Appendix A for methodology.
- 3 *Ibid.*
- 4 *Ibid.*
- 5 Andy Jassy. "2021 Letter to Shareholders," April 14, 2022: <https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/company-news/2021-letter-to-shareholders>.
- 6 Andy Jassy. "2024 Letter to Shareholders," April 10, 2025: <https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/company-news/amazon-ceo-andy-jassy-2024-letter-to-shareholders>.
- 7 The number of facilities is based on the number of establishment-specific records that Amazon reported to OSHA for 2020 through 2024. SOC analysis of injury and facility data submitted by Amazon to OSHA for 2024, See Appendix A for methodology.
- 8 *Ibid.*
- 9 *Ibid.*
- 10 *Ibid.*
- 11 SOC calculated the 2025 target total recorded injury rate for Amazon (3.3 injuries per 100 workers) by multiplying Amazon's reported total injury rate in 2020 (6.6 per 100 workers) by 0.5. Amazon made its announcement that it had a goal to reduce its total recordable injury rate by 50% by 2025 in 2021, when the last complete year of injury data available was 2020.
- 12 SOC analysis of injury and facility data submitted by Amazon to OSHA for 2024, See Appendix A for methodology
- 13 *Ibid.*
- 14 *Ibid.*
- 15 Sara Rhoads. "Amazon's safety performance continues to improve year over year," March 13, 2025: <https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/workplace/amazon-workplace-safety-performance-2024>.
- 16 SOC analysis of injury and facility data submitted by Amazon to OSHA for 2024, See Appendix A for methodology.
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- 18 Isobel Asher Hamilton and Áine Cain. "Amazon warehouse employees speak out about the brutal reality of working during the holidays, when 60-hour weeks are mandatory and ambulance calls are common," Business Insider, February 19, 2019: <https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-employees-describe-peak-2019-2>; Sara Ashley O'Brien. "What it's really like to be an Amazon warehouse worker during Prime Day," CNN Business, June 21, 2021: <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/06/21/tech/workers-amazon-prime-day>; Jules Roscoe. "'Grueling': Amazon Workers Describe What It's Like Working Peak Season," Vice, Dec. 15, 2022: <https://www.vice.com/en/article/wxna3q/grueling-amazon-workers-describe-what-its-like-working-peak-season>.

**19** “Peak Seasons, Peak Injuries: Amazon Warehouses are Especially Dangerous During Prime Day and the Holiday Season—and the Company Knows It,” United States Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, July 15, 2024:

[https://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/help\\_committee\\_amazon\\_interim\\_report.pdf](https://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/help_committee_amazon_interim_report.pdf).”; Same Day Injury: Amazon Fails to Deliver Safe Jobs,” The Strategic Organizing Center, 2024: [https://thesoc.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/342/SOC\\_Same-Day-Injury-Report-May-2024.pdf](https://thesoc.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/342/SOC_Same-Day-Injury-Report-May-2024.pdf).

**20** In 2023, OSHA began requiring employers to submit data on individual injury cases, in addition to the summary injury data that the agency has collected and made public previously. In April 2024, OSHA released an anonymized version of the individual case data that employers, including Amazon, had submitted. These case-level data allowed the SOC to analyze the timing of injuries during the year, using the date of each individual injury case.

**21** *Ibid.* See also: “When Is Amazon Prime Day 2024?” Amazon, July 16, 2024:

<https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/retail/amazon-prime-day-2024-date>.; “Amazon Prime Big Deal Days 2024: Everything you need to know to get deals October 8-9,” Amazon, Oct. 9, 2024:

<https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/retail/amazon-prime-big-deal-days-faq>.; “When is Amazon’s Black Friday sale? Here’s everything you need to know,” Amazon, Nov. 21, 2024:

<https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/retail/when-is-black-friday-2024>.

**22** SOC analysis of injury and facility data submitted by Amazon to OSHA for 2024, See Appendix A for methodology.

**23** *Ibid.*

**24** Due to this change in the methodology for the analysis in this report, ITA figures for Amazon for 2017 in Appendix B, and for “Other” injury rate for non-Amazon facilities in 2021 vary slightly from figures published in SOC’s previous reports.” TO “Due to this change in the methodology for the analysis in this report, “Other” injury rate for non-Amazon facilities in 2021 vary slightly from figures published in SOC’s previous reports.

**25** Sara Rhoads. “Amazon’s safety performance continues to improve year over year,” March 13, 2025:

<https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/workplace/amazon-workplace-safety-performance-2024>.

**26** U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, Quartile Data, “Total recordable cases - injuries and illnesses - detailed industry by establishment size – 2023,”

<https://www.bls.gov/iif/nonfatal-injuries-and-illnesses-tables/quartile-table-1-total-recordable-cases-2023-national.xlsx>

**27** SOC analysis of injury and facility data submitted by Amazon to OSHA for 2024, See Appendix A for methodology.

**28** “NEWS: Sanders Releases Sweeping Report Exposing How Amazon’s Obsession with Speed Injures Workers at Unprecedented Rates,” United States Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, December 16, 2024:

<https://www.help.senate.gov/dem/newsroom/press/news-sanders-releases-sweeping-report-exposing-how-amazons-obsession-with-speed-injures-workers-at-unprecedented-rates>.

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- 36 "Peak Seasons, Peak Injuries: Amazon Warehouses are Especially Dangerous During Prime Day and the Holiday Season—and the Company Knows It," United States Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, July 15, 2024, pg. 7: [https://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/help\\_committee\\_amazon\\_interim\\_report.pdf](https://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/help_committee_amazon_interim_report.pdf).
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**45** Due to this change in the methodology for the analysis in this report, ITA figures for Amazon for 2017 in Appendix B, and for "Other" injury rate for non-Amazon facilities in 2021 vary slightly from figures published in SOC's previous reports.





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