THE INJURY MACHINE
HOW AMAZON’S PRODUCTION SYSTEM HURTS WORKERS
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Introduction

Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, Amazon’s business has boomed as consumers shifted more of their shopping online. Amazon’s earnings in the first 12 months of the pandemic exceeded the previous three years combined. The company’s profits continued to grow in 2021, from $21.3 billion in 2020 to $33.4 billion in 2021. While shareholders and executives reaped the benefits of the company’s soaring stock price, Amazon’s aggressive growth has come at a high cost for its workers.

Amazon’s high-pressure operations keep resulting in worker injuries in unprecedented numbers, and the situation is worsening. The Strategic Organizing Center (SOC) analyzed the injury data that Amazon submitted to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) for 2021 and found that Amazon’s overall injury rate increased by 20 percent from 2020 to 2021. Amazon’s operations continue to be dramatically more dangerous for workers than the rest of the warehouse industry. In 2021, the serious injury rate at Amazon warehouses was 6.8 per 100 workers—more than double the rate at non-Amazon warehouses (3.3 per 100). Workers at Amazon facilities sustained nearly 40,000 injuries in 2021. While Amazon employed 33 percent of all U.S. warehouse workers in 2021, the company was responsible for a staggering 49 percent of all injuries in the industry last year.

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Amazon’s high injury rates are not new. As the SOC’s June 2021 report, “Primed for Pain,” documented, from 2017-2020, Amazon’s warehouses consistently had overall injury rates that were much higher than those of its competitors. Amazon’s obsession with speed has played a role in driving its injury rates higher. Amazon uses extensive productivity and monitoring systems to increase pressure on workers to move at dangerous speeds. The company’s high-pressure operations even prompted The Wall Street Journal to recently coin the term “Bezosism” to refer to “the way Amazon uses tech to squeeze performance out of workers.”
In 2020, at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic, Amazon initially relaxed work quotas to allow workers to take pandemic safety precautions. But by October 2020, even as COVID caseloads were beginning to rise during the pandemic’s second wave, Amazon reinstated its production-focused discipline policies—just ahead of Prime Day. Amazon’s obsessive focus on speed—and the monitoring and discipline systems it uses to enforce work rates—have been the center of worker advocacy efforts over the past year. These efforts include recent unionization drives, including the historic vote to form a union at Staten Island’s JFK8 warehouse and the vote at an Amazon facility in Bessemer, Alabama, BHM1. The serious injury rates at JFK8 had increased 15 percent from 2020 to 2021; in the same period, the serious injury rate at BHM1 had increased by 43 percent.

In Amazon’s home state of Washington, health and safety inspectors have confirmed what workers and observers have known for years: Amazon’s high-pressure production model hurts workers. Washington State OSHA (WA OSHA) has cited Amazon facilities near Seattle for violating federal health and safety law, and directly linked the company’s high pace of work and monitoring and discipline systems with the facilities’ high rates of injuries. Legislators are also taking notice of how Amazon’s abusive production system injures workers. In September 2021, California passed AB 701, a bill regulating the use of production quotas in warehouses. Proponents of the bill pointed specifically to Amazon’s unsafe work speed as a key motivator for the legislation. Similar bills have recently been introduced in other states, including Minnesota and Washington.

In response to rising scrutiny of its safety record, Amazon has scrambled to launch a public relations campaign to attempt to convince the public it is taking safety seriously. In April 2021, Amazon Founder Jeff Bezos said he wants to make Amazon “Earth’s Safest Place to Work.” The company claims to have invested millions of dollars in initiatives intended to promote safety. And Amazon declared in April 2021 that it aims to cut injury rates by 50 percent by 2025. The SOC’s analysis of Amazon’s injury data for 2021 finds that the company has not only failed to make any progress on improving its injury rates, but has performed substantially worse than in the previous year, raising significant questions about Amazon management’s commitment to preventing worker injuries.
Overview of Amazon’s Injury Data

SOC’s analysis is based on data that Amazon and other employers provided to OSHA annually from 2017 to 2021. Amazon reported injury and illness information for 715 facilities in 2020 and 906 in 2021. Those reports covered an average annual workforce that grew from 201,005 workers in 2017 to 566,736 in 2021.

All employers are legally required to submit annual injury and illness reports to OSHA for any warehouse, delivery, grocery, or wholesale trade facility with 20 or more employees.

These reports show that each year, tens of thousands of Amazon workers are injured on the job.

**FIGURE 1**

**Annual Injury Rates by Type at Amazon Facilities, 2017-2021**

As shown in Figure 1, Amazon’s injury rate over the last five years has been consistently high—above 7.4 injuries per 100 full-time equivalent workers (FTEs) in all but one year. The injury rate in 2021, 7.9 injuries per 100 workers, is the second-highest rate in the past five years and a sharp increase from 2020. 
From 2017 to 2021, the only year that Amazon’s injury rates declined, 2020, was the same year that Amazon temporarily eased its work speed pressures as part of its response to the COVID-19 pandemic by suspending disciplinary action against workers for underperformance on productivity metrics. However, in October 2020—just ahead of Prime Day—Amazon reimplemented its work rate, claiming to have “revised” its algorithms to accommodate COVID-related safety measures. Yet workers reported that the productivity pressures returned. In June 2021, Amazon claimed to be changing the way it monitored workers’ “Time off Task,” but experts called the tweak “tiny” and insufficient. Not surprisingly, injury rates increased in 2021 in tandem with the reimplementaion of Amazon’s immense production pressures on workers.

In 2021, there were 38,334 total recordable injuries—defined as those requiring medical treatment beyond first aid or requiring time off a worker’s regular job—at Amazon facilities. The vast majority of these were serious: 34,001, or 89 percent, of the injuries were categorized as either light duty or lost time injuries—that is, injuries where workers were hurt so badly that they were either unable to perform their regular job functions (light duty) or forced to miss work entirely (lost time). The number of employees and injuries by type are presented in Appendix B.

**DEFINING INJURY**

**LIGHT DUTY INJURIES**

Injuries that require workers to be placed on light or restricted duty relative to their normal job responsibilities.

**LOST TIME INJURIES**

Injuries that require workers to miss work entirely.

**SERIOUS INJURIES**

Light duty and lost time injuries combined.
Comparing Amazon Warehouses With the Rest of the Warehouse Industry

For the fifth year in a row, Amazon’s rate of injuries at its warehouses remains substantially higher than the rate at non-Amazon warehouse employers.\textsuperscript{21} And its rate of serious injuries is even worse—more than twice as high as the rate for all other warehouse employers.

As shown in Figure 2, in 2021, there were 7.7 injuries per 100 Amazon warehouse workers as compared to 4.0 injuries per 100 workers at all other warehouses. Amazon’s rate of serious injuries—light duty and lost time injuries—at its warehouses was 6.8 per 100 workers, as compared to 3.3 for all other employers in the warehouse industry.

\textbf{FIGURE 2}

\textbf{Injury Rates by Type at Amazon and Non-Amazon Warehouses, 2021}
Serious Injuries, Light Duty

Amazon’s Efforts to Reduce Costs by Keeping Injured Workers on the Job

When warehouse workers are seriously injured, Amazon has a strategy to push them to keep working while they are recovering—a policy that is designed to reduce the number of lost time cases and save the company money on workers compensation. SOC’s analysis of Amazon’s injury data found that Amazon warehouse workers who are seriously injured require substantially more time to recover than seriously injured workers in the rest of the warehouse industry, suggesting that worker injuries at Amazon are more severe.

In 2018, Amazon rolled out a “temporary light duty” program, which created additional positions for workers who were hurt too badly to perform their normal jobs. The policy apparently achieved Amazon’s goal of shifting some serious injuries out of the “lost time” category and into “light duty.” The percentage of serious injuries at Amazon classified as “lost time” fell from 78 percent in 2017 to 44 percent in 2020, and fell further to 35 percent in 2021. Lost time injuries are more expensive for the company than light duty cases in terms of workers compensation costs.

However, while Amazon has changed how it labels these injuries, its overall serious injury rate at its warehouses has increased—from 5.9 per 100 workers in 2020 to 6.8 per 100 workers in 2021. And as shown in Figure 3, warehouse workers at Amazon who are seriously injured need on average nearly 19 days more to recover from their injuries than non-Amazon workers—62.2 days at Amazon versus 43.5 days at all other warehouse employers. Of the Amazon workers surveyed by the SOC in 2021, 37 percent of those who had been injured reported that management pressured them to return to work before they felt ready to do so.

Warehouse workers at Amazon who are seriously injured need nearly 19 days more to recover from their injuries than non-Amazon workers.
The injury machine: Amazon’s production system hurts workers

In Washington state, officials recently increased Amazon’s workers compensation premiums by 15 percent after state officials determined the company’s facilities were more dangerous than other warehouses and that Amazon’s high injury rate was driving up costs for the entire warehouse industry.25

Amazon has internally acknowledged that its policy of shifting more injured workers into light duty will help the company lower costs. As Reveal reported in its 2020 exposé, the safety director for Amazon’s robotic warehouses stated in an internal email that if the temporary light duty policy were rolled out across all fulfillment centers, it had “the potential to reduce Lost Time Injuries and workers compensation costs by 70%.”26

**Average Recovery Time Per Serious Injury (Light Duty and Lost Time Days) at Amazon and Non-Amazon Warehouses, 2021**

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Robotic Facilities Have Higher Injury Rates

For the fifth year in a row, injury rates were higher at Amazon’s robotic warehouses than its non-robotic warehouses. Amazon has invested significantly in warehouse automation in the past 20 years—in 2012, it purchased the robotics company Kiva for $775 million. Robots fill a number of functions, including stowing new merchandise on shelves, picking products for customer orders, and moving items across warehouses. Amazon has claimed that robots not only increase productivity, but also make warehouses less dangerous, unveiling two new robots in 2021 that “could make work safer for employees.”

**FIGURE 4**

Injury Rates by Type at Amazon Robotic and Non-Robotic Sortable Fulfillment Centers, 2021
Yet injury rates remain higher at robotic warehouses than non-robotic warehouses, as shown in Figure 4. In 2021, Amazon’s sortable facilities with robotic technology had a serious injury rate of 7.3 per 100 workers, 28 percent higher than the rate at non-robotic sortable facilities (5.7 per 100). This is a 20 percent year-over-year increase in the injury rate at Amazon’s sortable robotic facilities from 2020 (6.1 per 100).

Injury rates at Amazon’s robotic facilities have consistently been higher than at its non-robotic facilities in every year for which data is available. The higher rates of injury in these robotic warehouses are not a surprise. Robots drive workers’ production speed higher in facilities with automation, making working conditions even more dangerous. One report found that the productivity target for the average picker, a worker who selects merchandise from shelves of bins, increases from 100 to 300-400 items per hour when robots are introduced into a warehouse. This makes Amazon’s monitoring systems even more punitive and increases the pressure on workers to move faster than is safe, since managers can discipline or even fire workers who cannot keep up with the robots.

The robotic system also forces workers to perform the same movements over and over again. These repetitive motions can increase the risk of injury, which becomes even more acute if workstations are not designed to properly fit individual workers or if the movements require excessive twisting, bending, and awkward postures.
OSHA Enforcement

Amazon’s High Pace of Work and ‘Willful’ Violation of Federal Health and Safety Rules

Safety inspectors have declared that Amazon’s working conditions are so dangerous that they violate health and safety regulations. In 2021 and 2022, WA OSHA issued four safety citations regarding Amazon’s dangerous workplaces. This includes a citation for 10 separate violations classified as “Willful,” the most serious finding that OSHA can issue. Only 0.4% of citations in OSHA’s 50-year history have been categorized as willful.34

In multiple reports, OSHA inspectors specifically pointed to Amazon’s “very high pace of work” and its “monitoring and discipline systems” as causes of its high rate of serious injuries. The SOC believes that this is the first time in the 50-year history of OSHA that an OSHA agency has determined that a company’s pace of work, on its own, is so high that it constitutes a separate violation of the OSHA Act, requiring specific steps to reduce work speeds.

Injury rates at a warehouse in DuPont, one of the facilities cited by WA OSHA inspectors, were so high that from 2016-2020, the warehouse had a recordable injury every 2.3 days.35 Washington State Attorney General Bob Ferguson wrote in a court filing—arguing that Amazon should be compelled to address OSHA’s findings while its appeal of the findings is pending—that the warehouse’s injury rates were so high that if Amazon were not compelled to address OSHA’s findings, “it is indisputable that...there will be hundreds of serious injuries at this worksite while this litigation is pending.”36

Instead of reducing the pace of work in order to comply with the law, Amazon doubled down. After WA OSHA issued its first citation in May 2021 at DuPont, an hour’s drive from Seattle headquarters, Amazon failed to fully implement mandated remedies and instead appealed the citation. The company’s safety chief Heather MacDougall later declared that workers’ productivity quotas have not been changed and said, “Safety and performance targets can go hand in hand.”37 And Amazon interfered with follow-up investigations at DuPont and other facilities, including by barring inspectors from entering warehouses and refusing to provide OSHA with necessary information. A court had to intervene and order Amazon to stop interfering with the safety investigations.38
After issuing a second citation at DuPont, WA OSHA found Amazon’s willful violations at a warehouse in Kent—another facility just a short drive from the Seattle headquarters—in March 2022. “Willful” violations are issued when companies are found to be “knowingly fail[ing] to comply with a legal requirement” or operating with “plain indifference to employee safety.” Inspectors said the “willful” determination was made at Kent because the company “is demonstrating plain indifference in that they have been made aware of the hazards and increased injury rates yet are making no effort to take corrective action.” The Kent citation again states that Amazon’s “very high pace of work” is injuring workers and finds 10 different areas of work in Kent in which Amazon is operating unsafely, as well as the overall violation regarding work pace and excessive monitoring.

Amazon is appealing the Kent citation as well. Even while the appeal is pending in court, Amazon is legally mandated to change how it operates in order to remedy the violations—including by ceasing the use of the abusive monitoring and discipline systems found by WA OSHA to violate health and safety standards and by setting a pace of work to decrease the risk of serious injuries.
Amazon’s Spin on Safety

In early 2022, Amazon released “Delivered with Care,” a 40-page public relations piece that gives the misleading impression that Amazon’s dangerous warehouses are becoming safer. It touts the fact that Amazon’s recordable injury rate in the U.S. improved by 25 percent from 2019 to 2020, during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic. In early 2022, Amazon released “Delivered with Care,” a 40-page public relations piece that gives the misleading impression that Amazon’s dangerous warehouses are becoming safer. It touts the fact that Amazon’s recordable injury rate in the U.S. improved by 25 percent from 2019 to 2020, during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic. Amazon also claims in the report that participants in Amazon’s “Huddle” program reduced their incidence of musculoskeletal disorders by 15 percent in 2021. But by the time this report was published, Amazon’s overall injury rate had actually increased by 20 percent from 2020 to 2021. And the fact that Amazon itself references its “Huddle” program’s impact in 2021 implies that the company had its complete 2021 injury data at the time “Delivered with Care” was written—meaning the company would have known that its overall injury rates had increased at the time of publication. This suggests that Amazon’s public disclosure about safety conditions in its own operations are designed to bolster the company’s chosen narrative and not to tell the actual story about workers’ injuries.
Conclusion

Amazon has spent years promising to improve safety at its warehouses. In 2021, it set a goal of halving its injury rates within five years. It claims to have spent $300 million on safety initiatives last year. And Founder Jeff Bezos declared that the company will become “Earth’s Safest Place to Work.”

Yet Amazon’s injury rates still went up. Its rate of injuries increased by 20 percent from 2020 to 2021. The company’s serious injury rate is now more than twice as high as the rate for all other warehouse employers. Amazon claims its robots will make warehouses safer, yet its robotic facilities became less safe in 2021 and injured workers at a rate nearly 30 percent higher than non-robotic facilities. In total, workers experienced nearly 40,000 injuries across Amazon’s network of facilities in 2021.

The facts show that for all of its public relations efforts, Amazon is not doing enough to keep workers safe. Authorities have stepped in to attempt to force Amazon to protect workers—from WA OSHA citations to California’s law on production quotas. However, Amazon is appealing Washington State’s findings and stating it will not slow the pace of work that is leading to its high injury rates.

Amazon does not lack the resources to make its workplaces safer. The company’s earnings were driven to record highs by the boom in online buying during the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2019, Amazon’s profits were $11.6 billion; by 2021, its profits had nearly tripled to $33.4 billion. Jeff Bezos’ personal net worth exploded from $115 billion to $188 billion in 2020.

Amazon could choose to slow the pace of work or ease the pressures of its oppressive monitoring systems. But after doing so in 2020 to accommodate pandemic safety precautions, the company largely returned to its old systems of surveillance and pressure in 2021—as reflected in the injury data. The company’s rate of worker injuries almost certainly will remain alarmingly high unless workers, advocates, regulators, and others force Amazon to take meaningful action to make its workplaces safer.
Appendix A: Methodology

Unless otherwise noted, all data on hours worked, injury numbers, and injury types are based on records submitted by Amazon to OSHA through OSHA’s Injury Tracking Application (“ITA”). They are available in full at https://www.osha.gov/Establishment-Specific-Injury-and-Illness-Data. Injury rates including Total Recordable Injury Rate (“TRIR” or “Case Rate”) and Serious Injury Rate (“DART”) were calculated as aggregates, not simple averages, of the various rates at individual locations. Injury rates are reported as injuries per 100 employees. OSHA assumes that 2,000 employee-hours equals one full-time annual employee (FTE).

Injury counts and hours worked were summed before calculating rates to ensure that rates were properly weighted and thus not skewed by smaller facilities. We use the term “injuries” to include both those cases recorded by Amazon as “injuries” and those recorded by Amazon as meeting OSHA’s definition of work-related “illnesses.” Work-related “illnesses” account for less than three percent of cases during the period covered by this analysis and could include heat-related conditions, skin diseases, respiratory conditions and poisoning, among others.

In the 2016 data set, only three Amazon facilities reported injury information through the OSHA’s public Injury Tracking Application (ITA). Based on a database compiled by the supply chain consulting firm MWPVL, there appear to have been as many as 176 Amazon facilities in operation that year (https://www.mwpvl.com/html/amazon_com.html). Because Amazon failed to report for the vast majority of its facilities in 2016, we are unable to include that data in this analysis. Amazon’s reports for 2017-2021, however, appear to be largely consistent with the list maintained by MWPVL.

This analysis is limited to Amazon’s warehousing and logistics operation, so facilities that Amazon reported operated under manufacturing NAICS codes (323117, 333992, and 334111) and retail trade NAICS codes (445110 and 455219) are not included in the analysis.
When reporting data to the ITA for 2021, Amazon re-classified 393 facilities it had previously reported as operating in the General Warehouse and Storage NAICS Code (493110) as operating in the Couriers and Express Delivery Service NAICS Code (492110). Because there was no discernable change in the work processes at these facilities and because this reclassification would make year-over-year comparisons of Amazon’s safety performance challenging, for the purposes of this analysis, all Amazon warehouse and logistics operations that were classified in previous years as in the General Warehouse and Storage industry (NAICS 493110) were included in the 2021 analysis of Amazon’s overall injury rates. Comparison between Amazon’s injury rates and those of all other employers in the warehousing industry was done between the facilities that Amazon categorized in NAICS 493110 and all other employers reporting facilities under that NAICS code.

Analysis on injury rates at robotic and non-robotic facilities includes only sortable facilities for which we have data on the presence or absence of robotic technology. Data on the presence of Kiva Robots at different fulfillment centers comes from “How Amazon Hid Its Safety Crisis,” Reveal, September 29, 2020, https://revealnews.org/article/how-amazon-hid-its-safety-crisis/. For sortable facilities not included in the Reveal report, local news reports regarding the opening of each facility were consulted to note the presence or lack of Kiva robots. In 2021, Amazon submitted injury data from 55 sortable fulfillment centers with robotic technology and 14 sortable fulfillment centers without robotic technology.

Appendix B: Total Injuries Reported by Amazon Facilities by Type, 2017-2021

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual Average Employees</th>
<th>Full-Time Equivalents</th>
<th>Lost Time Cases</th>
<th>Lost Time Days</th>
<th>Light Duty Cases</th>
<th>Light Duty Days</th>
<th>Total Other Cases</th>
<th>Total Cases</th>
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<td>1,509,145</td>
<td>4,333</td>
<td>38,334</td>
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</table>
Endnotes

1. “Amazon made more profit during the pandemic than in the past three years,” Engadget, Apr. 29, 2021: https://www.engadget.com/amazon-q1-2021-210221698.html
3. See methodology in Appendix A.
8. SOC analysis of Amazon injury data submitted to OSHA via ITA.
15 The number of Amazon facilities in 2020 that the SOC used for its analysis in the 2021 report, “Primed for Pain,” was 658. However, several of Amazon’s warehouse locations have multiple facilities at the same address. A more accurate count that disaggregates these facilities leads to a count of 715 facilities in 2020. Since injury rates are based on the count of Full-Time Equivalents and number of injuries across the universe of Amazon’s warehouses, injury rate data from “Primed for Pain” remains unchanged.
16 Rounding the underlying numbers leads to the appearance in Figure 1 of a serious injury rate of 6.9 and a total injury rate of 7.8 across Amazon’s facilities; however, Amazon’s 2021 lost time injury rate was 2.427, its light duty injury rate was 4.543, and its “other” injury rate was 0.888, making the serious injury rate 7.0 and the total injury rate 7.9 when rounded to the nearest tenth. See Appendix A for full methodology.
17 AMAZON.COM, INC. v. ATTORNEY GENERAL LETITIA JAMES, Case 1:21-cv-00767, Complaint, paragraphs 87-88.
21 See Methodology Appendix A.
23 Recovery time includes average light duty and lost time days per serious injury.


See also “Primed for Pain,” Strategic Organizing Center, May 2021: https://thesoc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/PrimedForPain.pdf


See Methodology appendix.


Enforcement Case File Information, Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, inspection number 317965723, Mar. 9, 2022 (obtained in response to public records request; on file with SOC)

Enforcement Case File Information, Washington State Department of Labor and Industries, inspection number 317965723, Mar. 9, 2022 (obtained in response to public records request; on file with SOC)


“Delivered with Care,” Amazon, Jan. 24, 2022, pg. 10: https://safety.aboutamazon.com/delivered-with-care

“Delivered with Care,” Amazon, Jan. 24, 2022, pg. 16: https://safety.aboutamazon.com/delivered-with-care


